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IN THF [ 1 AH COURT OF APPEAl S 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintifl7Appellee, : 
v. 
Case No. 20050282-CA 
ADAM KYLE PRICE, 
Defendant/Appellant : 
ARGUMENT 
The Brief of Appellee is significant for its failure to argue either that Adam Kyle 
Price's trial counsel provided adequate representation, or that trial counsel's faili lites 
might have been tiichciil in ii.ihii" 1 In stulr rxdusm l\ Irnisrs up-i'ii (lie prejudice 
pti :,. i •: the ineffective assistance test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 I J.S. 668 
(1984). 
"1 his reply addresses 1 I 1 lln* sl.ilr 1 inai 1111.1U11 ImurU'h/atiiiii >>l ln.il » uniicTs 
<..: - iki {2) its argument that no prejudice resulted from the undisputed inadequate 
representation. 
Point 1: The State Incorrectly Defines I he Issues Underlying .  
Ineffective Assistance Claim. 
NIr. Price cites six instances in which his trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance. They are that trial counsel: 
(1) attempted on the first day of trial to introduce evidence of three prior assault 
convictions both to establish the chief prosecution witness's violent propensities 
and to rebut his testimony as to peaceful character - without certified copies of the 
convictions; 
(2) failed to ensure the witness's appearance on the second day of trial; 
(3) failed to request a continuance on the second day of trial after discovering that the 
witness was not available; 
(4) failed to inquire into what role the state's case manager played in the witness's 
unavailability that second day; 
(5) eventually obtained admissible evidence of only one of the chief prosecution 
witness's three assault convictions; and, 
(6) effectively failed to mention the exhibits reflecting directly upon that witness's 
credibility and violent character during closing argument when those exhibits 
were initially admitted without any comment, explanation, or context that would 
have highlighted their relevance. 
Brief of Appellant, at 1-2. 
The state lumps all six deficiencies together under the rubric of providing 
"ineffective assistance by failing to further impeach an already impeached witness." 
Brief of Appellee, at 1. This description over generalizes Mr. Price's argument. 
These deficiencies had repercussions that exceed even the critical failure to 
impeach. Deficiencies 1-3 and 5-6 also bear directly upon Mr. Price's self-defense claim; 
to wit, his reasonable belief that "force intended or likely to cause death or serious bodily 
2 
injury ... [was] necessary to prevent death or serious bodily injury to himself or a third 
person...." Utah Code Ann. § 76~2-402(a) (2004).1 The state chronicles the physical 
evidence of struggle to minimize the strength of Mr. Price's self-defense claim. Brief of 
Appellee, at 10-11 (describing physical evidence and injuries).2 That the struggle was 
fierce, however, does not undermine Mr. Price's self-defense claim. Rather, this makes 
all the more critical trial counsel's dismal failure to prove up Mr. Armijo's prior crimes 
of violence in response to Mr. Armijo's self-proclaimed peaceful nature (deficiency 1); to 
secure Mr. Armijo's presence on day-two of trial to confront him with subsequently 
gathered evidence of his violent and untruthful character (deficiencies 2-3); to secure 
admissible evidence of two of Mr. Armijo's three assault convictions (deficiency 5); and, 
to explain how the video of Mr. Armijo from day-one of the trial and evidence of the 
single assault conviction not only undermine Mr. Armijo's credibility, but also how they 
support Mr. Price's self-defense claim (deficiency 6). 
1
 Mr. Price's opening brief explains: 
Price's attorney's failure to attack either the credibility of the most 
important prosecution witness when the entire case turned on credibility, or 
the witness's self-anointment as a peaceful and non-aggressive man when 
the witness's violent character was a central issue to Price's self-defense 
claim, likely affected the outcome of the trial. 
Brief of Appellant, at 24. 
2
 The Brief of Appellee, at 11, speculates about the meaning of the evidence. Were this 
an appeal claiming insufficiency of the evidence, argument regarding reasonable 
inferences from the evidence might be relevant. A different standard applies to 
ineffective assistance claims. Perhaps a reasonable juror could have concluded based 
upon the evidence at trial that Mr. Price went too far. The problem with the case on 
review, however, is that evidence that might well have changed the juror's mind was 
never introduced due to trial counsel's ineffectiveness. 
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Trial counsel's failure to inquire into the state's role in Mr. Armijo's unavailability 
as a witness (deficiency 4) goes to the very heart of Mr. Price's right to a fair trial. When 
an agent of the state interferes with the defendant's fundamental right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment, prejudice is presumed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692; U.S. v. 
Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n.25 (1984). What role did the state play in Mr. Armijo's 
unavailability? We will never know because trial counsel never asked. 
The argument that trial counsel's several failures affected only the opportunity to 
impeach Mr. Armijo ignores that these failures also deprived the jury of important 
evidence directly bearing upon Mr. Price's self-defense claim. 
Point 2: Trial Counsel's Performance Undermines Confidence In The 
Outcome. 
The state argues that the prejudice prong of the two-part Strickland test requires 
Mr. Price to show that but for trial counsel's ineffective assistance he would have been 
acquitted. Brief of Appellee, at 9. It concludes that there was no prejudice. Each claim is 
addressed below. 
To be sure, a guilty verdict will not be overturned without evidence that trial 
counsel's ineffective assistance may have affected the outcome. Establishing a likelihood 
of acquittal, however, is not required. 
To be found sufficiently prejudicial, defendant must affirmatively show that 
a "reasonable probability" exists that, but for counsel's error, the result 
would have been different. We have defined "reasonable probability" as 
that sufficient to undermine confidence in the reliability of the verdict. 
State v Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986), citing State v. Lair by, 699 P.2d 1187, 
1204-06 (Utah 1984). The 'different result' portion of the test is qualified by reference to 
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'undermined confidence.' This qualification shifts focus away from predicting the 
outcome. If trial counsel's numerous failures in Mr. Price's ' he-said/she-said' trial leave 
the review court questioning the underlying validity of the outcome, prejudice sufficient 
to warrant a new trial is established. The review court need not become supreme fact 
finder and reverse only if it concludes it would certainly have acquitted Mr. Price. 
Trial counsel's several failures do indeed undermine confidence in the verdict. 
Brief of Appellant, at 24-27 (detailing existence of prejudice). The state offers three 
arguments in response. 
First, the state argues there was enough physical evidence of a violent struggle that 
even if Mr. Armijo, the only witness to claim Mr. Price was the aggressor, was shown to 
be a man of untruthful and violent character, the jury would still have rejected Mr. Price's 
self-defense claim. As already noted, the physical evidence confirms little more than 
there was a fierce struggle. Physical evidence notwithstanding, evidence of Mr. Armijo's 
credibility and violent character were central to Mr. Price's defense that he was 
responding to a life-threatening attack. Mr. Price was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure 
to take even the most elementary steps to meaningfully bring this evidence to the jury's 
attention. 
Second, the state argues that Mr. Price's statements about fighting hard and being 
angry would have overcome his self-defense claim even if the jury were persuaded as to 
Mr. Armijo's violent and untruthful propensities. Mr. Price's statements are just as easily 
explained by Mr. Armijo's aggression and Mr. Price's rational fear of serious injury or 
death - which fear is entirely consistent with a self-defense claim under Utah Code Ann. 
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§§ 76-2-402(1), (5)(d) (2003). Nor would Mr. Price's anger necessarily defeat his self-
defense claim: such anger is consistent with the struggles that occurred earlier that day, 
as well as from the final provocation. 
The state finally asserts that Mr. Armijo was sufficiently impeached such that trial 
counsel's deficiencies were of no moment. This assertion lacks support in the record. As 
detailed by the Brief of Appellant, at 5-11, Mr. Armijo came off smelling like the 
proverbial rose. The first day of trial, Mr. Armijo testified at length about his peaceful, 
noble nature. (R. 131, at 102-103, 106.) When asked whether a rap sheet, itself 
inadmissible as evidence, refreshed his recollection about prior assault convictions, Mr. 
Armijo claimed he could not read due to injuries inflicted by Mr. Price. (R. 131, at 103-
05, 120.) Trial counsel's subsequent attempts to prove up the prior convictions were 
painfully inept. 
Trial counsel failed to ensure Mr. Armijo's presence the second day of trial to 
confront him before the jury with the single certified copy of an assault conviction that he 
had managed to secure. Nor could counsel confront Mr. Armijo with evidence that he 
testified untruthfully about his inability to read and the alleged injuries the day before. 
{See R. 132, at 326.) The right to confront one's accusers is vital to the truth-seeking 
process: 
When confrontation is available the accused has an opportunity, not only of 
testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of 
compelling him to stand face-to-face with the jury in order that they may 
look at him and judge by his demeanor and the manner in which he gives his 
testimony whether he is worth of belief. [Footnote omitted.] 
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State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980). In language especially relevant to 
Price's attorney's failure to nail down Armijo's violent tendencies and lack of credibility, 
one court observed: 
Experience teaches trial counsel that one of the most dangerous witnesses is 
one who has no hesitancy to Till in' crucial testimony or to tell half-truths. 
A supplement to that theorem, however, teaches that the testimony of such a 
witness can be totally destroyed where adequate background information 
concerning the witness has been developed and a thorough preparation of 
the facts carried out. 
United States v. Guillette, 404 F.Supp. 1360, 1371 (D. Conn. 1975). "Thorough 
preparation" is not a term applicable to Mr. Price's legal representation. 
Further regarding trial counsel's failure to secure Mr. Armijo's presence on day-
two of the trial, the court disclosed out of the jury's presence that the state's case manager 
had spoken to Mr. Armijo at the courthouse earlier that day, and that Mr. Armijo left 
thereafter. (R. 132, at 326.) Trial counsel failed even to inquire as to the substance of 
their conversation to determine what role the state played in Mr. Armijo's unavailability. 
(Id.) Had trial counsel uncovered some complicity with the witness's unavailability, 
additional time to secure the witness's presence would certainly have been warranted. 
Despite having additional time to secure certified copies of Mr. Armijo's 
convictions for violent offenses, and being on clear notice of the need to do so, trial 
counsel secured but one such document by the second day of trial. (R. 132, at 336, Def. 
Ex. 4.) The single copy was introduced and published to the jury without explanation. 
(R. 132, at 336.) Even during closing argument, trial counsel never explained to the jury 
its relation to Mr. Armijo's violent character and untruthful testimony, and to the 
reasonableness of Mr. Price's use of force in self defense. 
Trial counsel secured a brief video clip from day-one of the trial in which Mr. 
Armijo appeared to read something. (R. 131, at 98-99.) This video had the potential of 
discrediting both Mr. Armijo's claimed inability to read the rap sheet the day before, as 
well as his tale that injuries inflicted by Mr. Price caused this infirmity. However, due to 
trial counsel's failure to secure Mr. Armijo's presence, the video was introduced into 
evidence and shown to the jury without any context or explanation of its significance. (R. 
132, at 336-37.) The jury merely saw a different attorney attempting to refresh the 
memory of one of several witnesses from the day before about the involvement of Mr. 
Price's co-defendant in the struggle - standard practice in a courtroom, but an odd ritual 
to jurors who have little or no professional training or experience in the law. Even during 
closing argument, trial counsel failed to provide a clear explanation of the significance of 
the video to the jury. (See R. 132, at 403.) 
Unavailing, therefore, is the state's argument that no prejudice occurred because 
Mr. Armijo was sufficiently impeached, or that Mr. Armijo's violent and untruthful 
character was irrelevant to Mr. Price's defense. In sum, while Mr. Price's trial counsel 
may well have succeeded in confusing the jury, he most certainly did not succeed in 
painting Mr. Armijo as a violent and untruthful man - a picture amply supported by 
evidence the jury never received due to counsel's ineffective assistance. This undisputed 
ineffective assistance undermines confidence in the verdict. 
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CONCLUSION 
Trial counsel's ineffective assistance undermines confidence in Mr. Price's 
conviction. The conviction should be vacated, and the matter remanded for a new trial 
lis DATED this, lay of January, 2006 
John Pace 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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